Objective: An experiment studied the frequency and correlates of driver mind wandering.
INTRODUCTION
Drivers contend with various sources of dis traction, including telephone conversations, inter actions with invehicle information systems, and interactions with passengers (Hanowski, Perez, & Dingus, 2005; Heck & Carlos, 2008) . Unfortunately, the cognitive demands imposed by these distractions can impair driver perfor mance. Even handsfree distracting tasks can significantly increase a driver's subjective workload (Alm & Nilsson, 1994 , 1995 Matthews, Legg, & Charlton, 2003) and can cause the driver to focus his or her oculomotor scanning narrowly on the region directly in front of the vehicle (Brookhuis, De Vries, & De Waard, 1991 ; Y. C. Lee, Lee, & Boyle, 2009; Recarte & Nunes, 2000 Victor, Harbluk, & Engström, 2005) . Moreover, even after an object is fixated, cognitive distraction can impede visual detection and recognition (Strayer & Drews, 2007; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003) . Not surpris ingly, distraction engenders slow reactions to critical events (e.g., J. D. Lee, Caven, Haake, & Brown, 2001 ; Y. C. Strayer & Johnston, 2001 ; for reviews, see Caird, Willness, Steel, & Scialfa, 2008; Horrey & Wickens, 2006; Ishigami & Klein, 2009) and is a signifi cant risk factor for crash involvement (Neale, Dingus, Klauer, Sudweeks, & Goodman, 2005; Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997; Violanti, 1997) .
However, not all lapses of attention arise from overt secondary tasks. As demonstrated by a variety of findings, rather, offtask thoughts, or mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) , can compromise human performance independent of secondary task demands. Mind wandering appears to reflect a default brain state (Mason et al., 2007) that emerges during tasks that are boring or low in processing demand (Forster & Lavie, 2009; Giambra, 1995; Kane et al., 2007) . Cognitively, it entails a shift of atten tion away from the immediate task and context and toward taskirrelevant thoughts (Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 1970; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) . Mind wandering, at least when it occurs unintentionally or without explicit awar eness (Schooler, 2002; Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007) , is accompanied by performance losses in a variety of laboratory tasks, including tests of signal detection (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Smallwood et al., 2007) , reading comprehension (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2005; Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2008) , vigilance (Giambra, 1995) , and memory (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008) . During reading, mind wandering is accompanied by an increase in mean fixation durations and a decr ease in sensitivity to lexical factors that normally modulate fixation duration (Reichle, Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010) , effects that imply slower and more shallow information processing. Like secondarytask driver distraction (Strayer & Drews, 2007) , furthermore, mind wandering entails a decrease in the strength of the P300 component of the eventrelated potential (ERP; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & Handy, 2008) , a marker of attentional processing depth (Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977) .
Not surprisingly, driver mind wandering is a risk factor for crash involvement. In the classic Indiana TriLevel Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents (Treat et al., 1979) , 56% of the in depth crash cases analyzed involved failures of visual recognition, and among these, 15% invo lved drivers who were preoccupied by competing thoughts at the time of the accident. More recent analyses of crashes involving failures of driver attention have found that roughly 5% of the drivers were not engaged in a secondary task or attending to external distractors at the time of their crash but could be classified simply as "inattentive/lost in thought" (Stutts, Reinfurt, Staplin, & Rodgman, 2001) or "not paying attention/daydreaming" (Glaze & Ellis, 2003) .
Other work has found correlations between crash risk and a questionnaire measure of every day inattentiveness (Larson, Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997) and between accident risk and the tendency to participate in cognitive activ ities, such as daydreaming or thinking about personal problems, while driving (Violanti & Marshall, 1996) .
Thus, like secondarytask distraction, mind wandering appears to compromise driver per formance. Little is yet known, however, about the behaviors or performance changes by which mind wandering might engender driver risk, information that may be valuable for efforts to detect or mitigate inattentiveness (e.g., Donmez, Boyle, & Lee, 2006; D'Orazio, Leo, Guaragnella, & Distante, 2007; J. D. Lee, 2009) . The goal of the present experiment was therefore to identify changes in driver behavior and performance that occur during mind wandering. Participants performed a carfollowing task in a highfidelity driving simulator, and measures of vehicle con trol and oculomotor behavior were compared during and after episodes of selfreported mind wandering. Episodes of mind wandering were detected through a selfcaught procedure in which participants were simply asked to report any time they found themselves mind wander ing, a methodology that past work has validated for detecting unintentional episodes of offtask thought (Giambra, 1989; Schooler et al., 2005; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) . For converging evidence of selfreport validity in the current task, the simulated driving environment varied between nowind and heavywind conditions. Because vehicle control should demand more attention in heavy wind than in no wind, heavy wind should allow for fewer episodes of mind wandering.
Note that J. D. Lee, Young, and Regan (2009) distinguished driver distraction, the "diversion of attention away from activities critical for safe driving toward a competing activity" (p. 34) from driver inattention, "dimin ished attention to activities that are critical for safe driving in the absence of a competing activ ity" (p. 32). By these definitions, mind wander ing might be considered a form of distraction in which offtask thinking is the competing task (cf. Wickens & Horrey, 2009 ). However, in keeping with the terminology of the studies described above and of the mind wandering lit erature, we use the term inattention to describe mind wandering and use the term secondarytask distraction to describe failures of attention that accompany an overt competing task.
METHOD Participants
Eleven female and 7 male participants (mean age = 22 years, SD = 3.3) were recruited from the community of the University of Illinois. All participants were screened to ensure normal or correctedtonormal vision, at least 4 years of experience as a licensed driver, and no history of simulator sickness. Participants' mean self reported driving distance per year was 5,600 miles (range = 100 to 15,000 miles). Participants were paid $8 per hour for a 2.5hr experimental session.
Apparatus
Data were collected in a fully immersive, fixedbase driving simulator consisting of a 1998 Saturn SL body within a wraparound envi ronment with 135° forward and rear visual fields. Eight Epson Powerlite 703C projectors (1,024 × 768 pixels of resolution) projected the driving scenes onto eight separate screens. Road and traffic information was visible through the inte rior and exterior rear view mirrors.
Simulator control dynamics were modeled after a fourdoor Saturn sedan. The driving envi ronments and traffic scenarios were created using HyperDrive Authoring Suite Version 1.6.1 and displayed by Drive Safety's Vection Simu lation Software (Version 1.6.1; DriveSafety, 2004) . Measures of driving performance were sampled at 60 Hz. Eye and head movements were sampled at 30 Hz with a Smart Eye Pro 3.0 system (SmartEye AB, 2004) with the use of three dashboardmounted Sony XC HR50 mono chrome cameras. The Smart Eye system esti mates gaze position by tracking facial features and matching them to a driver profile estab lished during a calibration procedure. Because gaze position estimates are based on an array of facial features tracked with multiple cameras, the system is robust against occasional feature occlusions. Timestamped simulator and eye tracker data were synchronized and combined for analysis in postprocessing.
Driving Environment and Task
The simulated driving environment compri sed a straight, twolane rural road with small hills on one side and pasture, cattle, and houses on the other. There was no traffic in the oppos ing lane. The driving environment was purposely dull to encourage mind wandering (Kane et al., 2007) . The road was divided into two segments, one with no wind and the other with heavy lat eral wind. Direction of the wind, leftward or rightward, varied randomly within segments. The sequence of the nowind and heavywind segments was counterbalanced across drives. The participants did not know the sequence of the wind conditions before beginning each drive, and did not know the location at which the wind conditions would change.
A carfollowing task tested the participants' vehicle control. Participants were asked to main tain lateral control and a safe headway distance while following a lead car (a blue Grand Prix) and keeping ahead of a trailing car (a red Grand Prix). The trailing vehicle was used to motivate participants to check their mirrors. The lead car drove at an average speed of 45 mph, accelerat ing or decelerating within the range from 40 mph to 50 mph at random intervals. The partici pants' car began each drive positioned midway between the lead and the following vehicle, which maintained a constant dis tance of 200 m from each other. Participants were told to keep their attention on the driving task as much as possible and were instructed that they should press a button on the steering wheel to report any time they found themselves mind wandering. To clarify the task for them, participants were given a definition and examples of mind wandering. Mind wandering was defined as "thinking about any taskunrelated images and thoughts," and behindthewheel mind wan dering was illustrated with the examples of planning a sche dule, having recollections of childhood, or simply having a blank mind.
Procedure
After arriving at the lab, participants com pleted an informed consent form, a screening questionnaire inquiring about their driving exp erience and propensity for simulator sickness, and a demographic questionnaire. After the cal ibration procedure for the eye tracker, partici pants were provided with a description of the experimental task and then completed a practice drive including both nowind and heavywind conditions to familiarize themselves with the simulator and the driving environment. The exp eriment began after participants reported they understood the task and were comfortable in the simulator. Each participant completed four exp erimental drives of approximately 15 min each, with rest between drives.
RESULTS

Frequency of Mind Wandering
Participants reported more episodes of mind wandering per drive in nowind conditions (M = 5.69) than in heavywind conditions (M = 3.72), t(17) = 3.67, p < .01. Thus, as expected, driving conditions that placed heavier demands on att ention appeared to produce fewer episodes of mind wandering.
Correlates of Mind Wandering
Further analyses were carried out to determine how performance changed during mind wander ing. For this purpose, the time window from -13 s to -4 s prior to each button press was designated as a mind wandering interval and the window from 20 s to 29 s after the button press as an attentive interval. Intervals were limited to 10s duration to minimize the risk that analysis would extend beyond the onset of each mind wandering episode (cf. Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008) , as past work has indicated that the mean interval between shifts of thought topic is roughly 14 s (Klinger, 1978) . The time window from -3 s to 0 s was excluded from analysis to avoid pos sible contamination from the demand to execute a button press when reporting a mind wander ing episode, and the window from 20 s to 29 s postreport was chosen as the interval of atten tive driving to eliminate the influence of poten tial corrective overadjustments to their driving behavior that participants might make immedi ately when emerging from mind wandering. This therefore represented a conservative test of the potential changes that occurred during mind wandering. Analyses using the time window from 4 s to 13 s postreport as the interval of attentive driving produced effects of mind wan dering similar to those reported here.
Dependent measures were analyzed using 2 × 2 withinsubject ANOVAs with mental state (mind wandering vs. attentive) and wind turbu lence (no wind vs. heavy wind) as factors. Mea sures chosen for preliminary analysis were the mean and standard deviation of lane position, velocity, headway distance to lead car, time to contact the lead car, and the horizontal and vertical standard deviation of gaze position. Measures of lane position, velocity, headway distance, and time to contact assessed the par ticipants' ability to monitor and control the vehi cle, whereas the horizontal and vertical standard deviation of gaze position measured how broadly participants distributed their visual attention. Where appropriate, post hoc analyses of addi tional measures explored effects revealed by the analyses of preliminary measures.
No collisions between the participants' vehi cle and either the lead or the following vehicle occurred during data collection. Because 2 par ticipants reported no episodes of mind wander ing in either the nowind or heavywind condition, analyses reported as follows included data from only 16 participants. = .88, but no reliable main effect of mental state and no reliable interaction, both Fs < 1.
Longitudinal control. Preliminary analyses of longitudinal vehicle control examined means and standard deviations of velocity, headway dis tance to the lead car, and time to contact the lead car. Mean velocity showed no reliable effects, all Fs < 1, a finding that is unsurprising given that the participant's mean velocity was deter mined by the velocity of the lead and trailing vehicles. The remaining five measures of longi tudinal control all showed reliable main effects indicating higher means and higher variability in heavy wind, all ps < .01. However, only one mea sure, the standard deviation of velocity, pro duced a reliable main effect of mental state, indi cating slightly lower variability during mind wandering Vertical and horizontal deviation of gaze position. Approximately 14% of gaze data sam ples were dropped during eye tracking. However, the pattern of effects reported next was unchan ged when data were reanalyzed to include only those participants for whom less than 10% of samples was dropped (n = 9, M = 5.2% of sam ples dropped).
Analysis of mean values of the standard deviation of horizontal eye position (Figure 1 ) produced neither a reliable main effect of wind turbulence, F < 1, nor a reliable interaction, F(1, 15) = 2.94, p = .11, η 2 partial = .16, but did reveal a reliable main effect of mental state, F(1, 15) = 14.19, p < .01, η 2 partial = .49, indicating that the horizontal dispersion of the partici pants' gaze was smaller during mind wandering than during attentive driving. To examine this effect more closely, a further analysis assessed the proportion of gaze dwell time spent in the side mirrors (Figure 2 ). Left and rightside checks were combined for analysis. Analysis produced no reliable main effect of wind condi tion and no reliable interaction, both Fs < 1, but did evince a reliable main effect indicating less time spent gazing at the side mirrors during mind wandering than during attentive driving (M = 6% vs. frequent when wind conditions made the driv ing task more demanding of attention. Lateral vehicle control appeared robust to mind wan dering, showing no reliable differences between intervals of inattentive and attentive driving. Longitudinal control showed only modest chan ges during inattention, with drivers showing a decrease in the variability of velocity but no changes in headway distance or time to contact the lead vehicle. Mind wandering was accom panied, however, by a narrowing of visual atten tion, with drivers gazing less at their side mirrors and reducing the horizontal dispersion of gaze position, much as they do during secondarytask distraction (Brookhuis et al., 1991 ; Y. C. Recarte & Nunes, 2000 Victor et al., 2005) . The current data thus suggest that driver mind wandering entails a failure to scan or monitor the environment, an effect that might easily con tribute to the increased crash risk associated with behindthewheel inattentiveness (Larson et al., 1997; Violanti & Marshall, 1996) . These results add to a large and growing body of evi dence that cognitive load can compromise driver performance and document that this compro mise can occur even in the absence of overt sec ondary distraction. This of course does not imply that the performance consequen ces of mind wandering are the same as those of secondary task distraction (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003) . For example, although susceptibility to mind wandering varies with primarytask demands (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2009; Giambra, 1995; Kane et al., 2007; Smallwood, Baracaia, et al., 2003; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003) , the frequency, con tent, and cognitive demands of mind wan dering are only indirectly controlled by the exter nal world. In contrast, secondarytask load can be imposed and modulated very directly by the agent's environment (cf. Drews, Pasupathi, & Strayer, 2008) . Secondarytask distraction may thus be more difficult to disengage from than mind wandering. Secondarytask load may also have inherently stronger or deeper consequences than mind wandering. As noted earlier, both mind wandering and secondarytask distraction decrease the strength of the P300 component of the ERP (Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008; Strayer & Drews, 2007) . Secondarytask dis traction, however, has also been shown to delay P300 onset (Strayer & Drews, 2007) , whereas mind wandering has not (Smallwood, Beach, et al., 2008) . Nonetheless, the present results suggest that mind wandering can affect driver performance in at least some ways similar to secondarytask distraction.
Mind wandering-related performance losses beyond those observed here, of course, are also possible. Most notably, the current experimen tal procedure, using the selfcaught method of detecting mind wandering episodes, did not allow for comparing drivers' responses to road hazards or sudden critical events (e.g., the onset of brake lights in a lead car) during periods of mind wandering and attentiveness. Alternative methods of detecting mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) can potentially do so, how ever, and past findings (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2007; Smallwood, Beach et al., 2008) along with the data reported above sug gest that mind wandering is likely to hinder the ability to notice and respond to external events demanding quick action. The design of current driving task might also have hidden or miti gated additional possible changes in car follow ing during mind wandering. Here, a trailing car followed the participant's vehicle, maintaining a constant separation from the lead car. As noted, the purpose of the trailing vehicle was to provide incentive for participants to check their rearview and side mirrors. The presence of a trailing vehicle, however, might also have encouraged participants to maintain a higher speed or lower headway distance during mind wandering than they otherwise would. Indeed, drivers with secondarytask distraction often decrease their speed (e.g., Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Haigney, Taylor, & Westerman, 2000) or increase headway distance (e.g., Kubose et al., 2006; Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2006) . Further work will be necessary to determine whether such changes might occur during mind wan dering when there is no trailing vehicle to dis courage them.
More interestingly, the study of mind wan dering may explain why such performance chan ges occur during secondarytask distraction. Decreases in speed and increases in headway distance can increase a distracted driver's mar gin of safety and are often interpreted as com pensatory strategies for mitigating the costs of high cognitive load (Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Haigney et al., 2000) . However, other data question the idea that distracted drivers modu late their behavior to minimize risks. Drivers generally underestimate the performance costs of secondarytask distraction, for example (Horrey, Lesch, & Garabet, 2008; Lesch & Hancock, 2004; White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004) , implying that they may feel little need to modu late their behavior in response to a distracting task. Moreover, even drivers who increase their carfollowing headway during secondarytask distraction may fail to show any compensatory changes when performing the more complex maneuver of passing a car (Horrey & Simons, 2007) . These results suggest that performance changes that appear to compensate for the risks of secondarytask distraction may not actually be purposeful adaptations to high load but might rather be among the unintended conse quences of high load. Performance changes that look like strategic responses to distraction, that is, might in fact be the inherent products of that distraction. Methods for distinguishing strate gic from nonstrategic performance changes may therefore be necessary to gauge the full mental toll of driver distraction and inattention.
The study of mind wandering may provide one such method. Strategic compensatory behaviors are difficult to distinguish from unintended con sequences of secondarytask distraction because drivers will often, if not always, be aware that they are performing a secondary task. In contrast, mind wandering that occurs without a driver's conscious awareness disallows intentional com pensatory behaviors. Performance changes that occur before a report of selfcaught mind wan dering, and presumably before the driver has become conscious of mind wandering, cannot be attributed to strategic behavioral changes. Such effects will thus be more likely to reflect inherent and unintended consequences of inat tention or, at best, automatic and nonconscious adaptations to inattention. By differentiating between strategic and nonstrategic consequences of inattention, the study of mind wandering might thus inform the understanding of distracted driv ing more generally.
KEY POINTS
• Driver mind wandering is a risk factor for crash involvement.
• Participants in the current study were asked to report selfcaught episodes of mind wandering while they performed a carfollowing task in a highfidelity simulator.
• During mind wandering, participants tended to scan the environment more narrowly.
